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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5592
This paper examines the growth patterns of emerging 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) countries prior to the global financial crisis. The 
aim is to draw lessons on what policies can best position 
these countries going forward to enjoy growth without a 
buildup in macro and financial vulnerability. 
   Cluster analysis is used to classify these countries across 
the growth and vulnerability dimensions; namely, a 
classification into low or high growth outcomes, each of 
which may occur with low or high vulnerability features. 
The vulnerability indicators used are multifaceted, 
covering both the domestic and the external dimensions 
that have been identified in previous studies as being good 
indicators of likelihood of crisis—itself understood as 
multidimensional. Based on multinomial logit regressions, 
the initial conditions and the economic policies that 
might affect the probabilities of being in each of the four 
possible cluster combinations are examined. 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network; and Europe and Central Asia 
Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at sghosh@worldbank.org, nsugawara@worldbank.org, jzalduendo@
worldbank.org. 
   Many (if not most) of the countries in the sample 
experienced very large capital inflows relative to their 
gross domestic product prior to the crisis, which can 
complicate macroeconomic management and lead to 
a buildup of vulnerability. These large inflows were 
partly due to the high liquidity in global markets and, 
at least for some countries in the country sample, the 
particular attractiveness of “new Europe and emerging 
countries in the region” in the eyes of foreign investors. 
Nonetheless, the analysis finds strong evidence that 
the macroeconomic and structural policies that over 
time influence the structure of the economy, can play 
a significant role in explaining (and, going forward, 
in influencing) the different growth and vulnerability 
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Trade-Offs—Lessons from Emerging Europe and the CIS 
1 
Although all the transition countries and Turkey were affected by the global financial crisis, 
there was a significant variation across countries.
2 Some countries in the re gion experienced larger 
capital outflows and suffered severe recessions. For instance, Latvia experienced capital outflows—after 
controlling for exchange rate changes—amounting to almost 16 percent of GDP during 2008-10 (Table 
1) and a contraction in economic activity from peak to trough (2007-09) of 21.4 percent (Table 2), but 
other countries experienced lower capital reversals and milder contractions in economic activity. 
But  a  close  examination  suggests  that  there  were  significant  differences  in  the  growth-
vulnerability experiences of countries prior to the onset of the crisis. Some sustained relatively high 
growth without a buildup of excessive domestic and external imbalances that have been documented by 
others as a source of vulnerability (both to the possible onset of a crisis and to the deeper recessions 
that typically follow).
3 At the other end of the spectrum,  some countries experienced a buildup in 
vulnerability through the accumulation of imbalances without enjoying high growth.  In fact, individual 
countries also had a variety of experiences during the decade, shifting from―relatively speaking―lower 
growth to higher growth and from lower vulnerability to higher vulnerability—and all other possible 
combinations.
4 In part these differences reflect that countries were at different stages of both their 
transition and convergence p aths; thus, the role of initial conditions is  key  in identifying empirical 
regularities on economic policies. 
What drives these differences?  The goal of this paper is precisely to shed light on the factors 
behind the variety of  growth-vulnerability experiences. Is there a  set of initial conditions and policies 
that might  best position countries to enjoy growth without a  buildup of vulnerability? What role do 
trade and financial openness play in the growth -vulnerability outcomes? Are there types of  trade and 
financial openness that might diminish the risks of f alling into unwanted outcomes? Undoubtedly, the 
best is for countries to achieve high er  growth without making themselves vulnerable to a crisis. 
Moreover, the worst possible combination is to achieve lower growth while being highly vulnerable to a 
crisis. In sum,  this paper  takes  the  view that policy  makers need to be aware of the possible 
combinations of risk and reward and do what is in their power to achieve the coveted high reward-low 
risk combination.  
                                                           
1 Prepared by Swati Ghosh (PRMVP, sghosh@worldbank.org), Naotaka Sugawara (ECACE, nsugawara@worldbank.org), and 
Juan Zalduendo (ECACE, jzalduendo@worldbank.org), all three at the World Bank. We wish to thank the useful comments 
received from Elena Kantarovich, Martin Raiser, and Ulrich Zachau; of course all errors are our exclusive responsibility. The 
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. 
2 The countries in the econometric estimation include: Azerbaijan, Albania, Arm enia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and seven new EU member states. It excludes 
Czech and Slovak Republics, and Slovenia due to the lack of the debt data required to carry out the cluster analysis exercise. 
3 Bakker and Gulde (2010) find that, for the new EU member states, the countries with the largest growth in domestic credit to 
the private sector experienced the sharpest increase in aggregate demand and overheating prior to the crisis and, in turn, saw 
the sharpest drop in domestic demand (and output) following the crisis.   
4 It is worth clarifying that the classification is a relative one into lower or higher growth and lower or higher vulnerability. We 
also pursued a more granular classification with similar conclusions, such as low, medium, and high growth and vulnerability 
outcomes. The difficulty of such classification is that it results in too many categories that complicate the presentation and 
discussion—as well as resulting in too few observations within each group; a 3 by 3 matrix generates 9 possible outcomes. 2 
 
To our knowledge, the only paper that has pursued a similar line of analysis is Atoyan (2010). 
This paper expands his analysis, however. First, vulnerability is defined more broadly. Atoyan uses two 
indicators of external vulnerability: namely the current account deficit and the accumulation of external 
debt. By contrast, we consider vulnerability to be multifaceted, covering both external and domestic 
dimensions. For instance, external vulnerabilities may be a source of risk, but they might occur with or 
without banking sector vulnerabilities. Thus, monitoring banking sector developments is also critical. 
Second, our focus is primarily on the policy angle. To this end, controls are introduced not only for a 
country’s initial conditions and economic structure, but also for global push factors that might impact 
the growth-vulnerability dimensions. This allows a more detailed examination of the role of economic 
policies; namely, the role of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, as well as of de jure measures 
on  capital  account  liberalization.  Finally,  the  interpretation  of  the  estimated  coefficients  from 
multinomial logits is always cumbersome. This paper puts forward two graphical representations based 
on underlying probabilities that, in our view, facilitate the interpretation of the estimation results. 
Table 1: External Positions of Western Banks vis-à-vis Transition Countries and Turkey 
(adjusted for exchange rate changes) 
 
Source: BIS Locational Statistics and IMF WEO Database October 2010; authors’ calculations. 
A caveat is in order.  On the one hand, the strength of the results may be specific to the region, 
which  indeed  experienced  some  of  the  largest  external  imbalances  (and,  eventually,  external 
adjustments) that emerging markets have ever had to tackle. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that 
some of the global events that characterized the increased process of integration might not repeat 
themselves in the near future; for example, the excessive global liquidity of 2003-07. On the other hand, 
however, some regularities  are evident from the data and, thus, provide policy prescriptions going 
forward: a better understanding of the determinants of  different growth-vulnerability combinations 
seems warranted and this paper attempts to provide some preliminary answers. 
1.  Methodology and Stylized Facts 
The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate the relative importance of economic policies 
and  other  factors  in  defining  the  balance  between  vulnerability  (risk)  and  growth  (reward).  As 
mentioned earlier, a multifaceted approach to vulnerability is taken. Specifically, several indicators are 
2007Q3 2008Q3 2010Q2 2007Q3 2008Q3 2010Q2 2007-2008 2008-2010
Latvia 18.6 23.4 18.0 55.0 69.0 53.1 14.0 -15.9
Estonia 17.2 19.1 16.0 72.6 80.7 67.5 8.1 -13.2
Lithuania 16.0 22.3 17.8 33.9 47.3 37.8 13.3 -9.4
Ukraine 24.0 38.1 22.7 13.3 21.2 12.6 7.8 -8.5
Romania 49.5 70.2 59.4 24.2 34.4 29.1 10.1 -5.3
Russia 178.0 210.3 126.9 10.7 12.6 7.6 1.9 -5.0
Kazakhstan 18.0 21.2 15.0 13.3 15.6 11.1 2.3 -4.5
Bulgaria 13.2 24.6 22.4 26.5 49.2 44.9 22.7 -4.3
Turkey 125.2 156.1 138.5 17.1 21.4 19.0 4.2 -2.4
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3.9 4.6 4.2 20.8 25.0 22.7 4.2 -2.3
Hungary 72.2 94.3 90.7 46.4 60.6 58.3 14.2 -2.3
Moldova 0.4 0.6 0.5 6.2 10.6 8.7 4.4 -2.0
Poland 95.6 128.2 123.1 18.1 24.2 23.3 6.2 -1.0
Croatia 39.3 42.2 41.6 56.7 60.9 60.1 4.2 -0.8
Belarus 2.5 3.1 2.8 4.1 5.1 4.5 1.0 -0.5
Georgia 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.7 4.3 3.8 0.6 -0.5
Azerbaijan 1.5 3.6 3.5 3.2 7.8 7.6 4.6 -0.2
Armenia 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.3 1.9 2.6 0.6 0.7
FYR Macedonia 0.3 0.5 0.6 3.1 5.4 6.5 2.2 1.1
Albania 0.6 0.7 1.2 4.3 5.5 9.4 1.2 3.9
Levels (in billions of US$) Levels (in % of 2008 GDP) Flows (in % of 2008 GDP)3 
 
used to define vulnerability across the domestic and external dimensions―all of which have been well 
documented in previous studies as heightening a countries’ vulnerability to crises (e.g., Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999). Also, as noted earlier, the classification is a relative one that is obtained through a 
arms-length methodology described below. The domestic indicators include financial sector factors as 
well as public finances; namely, loan-to-deposit ratios as a measure of banks’ balance sheets, private 
sector credit growth as a measure of economic overheating, and fiscal balances to measure the nature 
of the saving-investment imbalances. External indicators focus on FX liquidity indicators (short-term 
debt on a remaining maturity as a share of a country’s foreign exchange reserves), a balance sheet 
indicator (debt-to-GDP), and the overvaluation of the real effective exchange rate measured by the 
deviation from its HP filtered series. Across both the domestic and external dimensions the focus is on 
indicators that can be considered the outcome of initial conditions and economic policies, and the state 
of global economic conditions. 
Table 2. Change in GDP and Its Components―From Peak to Trough 
 
Source: IMF WEO Database, October 2010. 
Note: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Poland are excluded as they have not suffered a 
decline in real GDP. Latvia and Estonia are the only two countries that reached their GDP peak in 
2007; all others did so during 2008. 
Comparing countries across multiple dimensions is never straightforward. Debt-to-GDP ratios 
might increase, but banking sector developments might be a source of stability; or, on the contrary, add 
to already weak balance sheet developments. This paper looks at these indicators simultaneously using 
a methodology known as cluster analysis (CA). The advantage of cluster analysis is that it does not 
impose ad-hoc thresholds to identify groups in the data. Instead, it lets the data speak for itself. In a 
nutshell,  it  minimizes  differences within  each  cluster  of  data  and  maximizes  the  differences  across 
clusters (Everitt, 1993). Specifically, for each country i in the sample and each year t in the period 2000-
08, the six indicators mentioned above are normalized.
5 CA is applied on these normalized  indicators 
and two groups  are  created: lower  vulnerability countries and high er  vulnerability countries.  The 
methodology does not fully eliminate the arbitrariness common to the setting of ad-hoc thresholds (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In fact, one must still decide into how many groups the data needs to be 
divided. Nevertheless, it is still considered an arms-length tool to classify data and allows choosing the 
number of groups in such way that the ir interpretation becomes tractable.
6 Of course it helps that we 
                                                           
5 Given the lack of a theory on how to gauge the relative importance of the six vulnerability indicators, all six indicators enter CA 
with the same weight. 
6 This paper also chooses two groups or clusters in both the growth dimension and the vulnerability dimension, which in effects 




Latvia -21.4 -35.3 -13.8 -42.7
Estonia -18.3 -26.5 -18.3 -37.3
Ukraine -15.1 -23.0 -25.6 -38.6
Lithuania -14.8 -25.3 -14.3 -29.4
Armenia -14.2 -16.5 -11.9 -19.4
Russia -7.9 -14.1 -4.7 -30.4
Romania -7.1 -12.6 -5.5 -20.6
Moldova -6.5 -16.4 -7.8 -19.3
Hungary -6.3 -11.5 -9.1 -15.4
Croatia -5.8 -9.3 -16.2 -20.7
Bulgaria -5.0 -15.0 -9.8 -22.3
Turkey -4.7 -7.2 -5.3 -14.3
Georgia -3.9 -11.6 -0.9 -19.4
Bosnia & Herzegovina -3.1 -6.7 -4.0 -11.0
FYR Macedonia -0.8 -2.5 -7.9 -10.54 
 
restrict groups to low and high and CA ensures these are determined based on data characteristics. 
Indeed, while more groups would increase accuracy, it would also make the presentation more difficult 
to follow. 
The cluster analysis methodology is also applied across the growth dimension so that countries 
can be classified each year as being either lower or higher growth. Here too growth is viewed as the 
outcome of policies, initial conditions and global conditions—and, once again, it should be viewed as a 
relative classification. Together with the classification into lower or higher vulnerability, this yields four 
possible  clusters;  namely,  lower  growth  and  lower  vulnerability  (L),  lower  growth  and  higher 
vulnerability (V), higher growth and lower vulnerability (G), and higher growth and higher vulnerability 
(H). Clearly, the best outcome for any country is cluster G and the one that countries should aim to avoid 
is cluster V. The methodology allows us to classify countries differently each year. It can be argued that 
growth determinants have medium-term features and that using an annual classification might mask 
cyclical  factors.  Thus,  we  also  consider  a  two-year  average  classification  and  are  restricted  from 
adopting an even longer classification on account of the size of the data sample. As an example, Table 3 
presents the clustering results across the growth dimension for 2004 and 2008. BiH and Hungary are the 
two countries within the lower growth clusters that experience the highest growth rate (respectively, 
growth was 6.31 and 4.86 percent), and both of these countries had growth rates below the minimum 
of those recorded among the two higher growth clusters G and H. 
Table 4 shows the results of the clustering exercise. A few examples facilitate the interpretation 
of  the  table.  In  2000,  three  countries  experienced  higher  growth  and  lower  vulnerability—Estonia, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia (cluster G). In contrast, six countries are classified as experiencing lower growth 
and higher vulnerability in the same year (cluster V); these are Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Latvia, Moldova, Turkey, and Ukraine. In all cases the classification is a relative one. Interestingly, no 
country belongs to the higher growth and higher vulnerability cluster (cluster H) in 2000, while eleven 
countries belong to the lower growth and lower vulnerability cluster (cluster L) during that year. In 2008, 
no country is classified in the higher growth and higher vulnerability group. This reflects the fact that 
many of the highly vulnerable countries, such as Latvia and Lithuania, had already started to experience 
an  economic  slowdown.  Croatia,  Turkey,  and  Kazakhstan  fall  at  the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum 
(cluster L). It is interesting that countries classified in 2008 as vulnerable (cluster V) are most of those 
that faced balance of payments problems; the one exception is Romania. 
Table 3. Real GDP Growth Statistics in Each Cluster—2004 and 2008 
 
Source: IMF WEO Database, October 2010. 
As shown in Figure 1, the six indicators that define vulnerability at the level of each of the four  clusters 
(or groups) behave largely as expected. The red line tracks the median values of countries classified in 5 
 
the H cluster (higher growth and higher vulnerability) and the blue line does the same for countries in 
cluster  L  (lower  growth  and  lower  vulnerability).  The  difference  between  the  red  and  blue  lines  is 
usually, though not always, the starkest. Perhaps this reflects the extent to which the indicators have a 
greater impact along the growth dimension or along the vulnerability dimension. For example, countries 
classified in the H cluster (red line) seem to experience the highest growth rates in private sector credit, 
higher rates of real exchange rate overvaluation, very high loan-to-deposit ratios, and the highest levels 
of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserve ratios. Debt-to-GDP ratios are also high (together with 
those observed among the lower growth and higher vulnerability countries). In contrast, countries in the 
L cluster (blue line) have, for the most part, the opposite characteristics. At the level of the G (higher 
growth,  lower  vulnerability,  depicted  by  the  green  dash  line)  and  V  (lower  growth  and  higher 
vulnerability, depicted by the purple dash line) clusters, the outcomes are more mixed. The G cluster 
(higher growth and lower vulnerability) shows high private sector credit growth and a relatively large 
increase in the loan to deposit ratio until 2007. This cluster also shows a slight REER overvaluation in 
2007 and 2008. On the other hand, the G cluster’s external debt and short term debt are the lowest 
among all clusters. For the lower growth and higher vulnerability cluster V, the fiscal deficit and debt 
ratios are high. 
Table 4. Evolution of the Growth-Vulnerability Clusters—Period 2000-08 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Cluster H has no countries in 2000 and 2008, but does have countries in all other years in the covered period. 
Lower Growth and Lower Vulnerability (Group or Cluster L) Lower Growth and Higher Vulnerability (Group or Cluster V)
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Croatia FYRM
Georgia Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania
Azerbaijan Belarus BiH Bulgaria Croatia FYRM
Georgia Hungary Poland Romania Russia
Albania Belarus BiH Bulgaria Croatia FYRM
Georgia Poland Romania Russia
Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia FYRM Hungary
Poland Romania Ukraine
Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia FYRM Moldova
Poland Russia Turkey Ukraine
Higher Growth and Lower Vulnerability (Group or Cluster G) Higher Growth and Higher Vulnerability (Group or Cluster H)
Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania
Moldova Turkey Ukraine
Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania
Moldova Turkey
Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania
Romania Ukraine
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus BiH Bulgaria
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Figure 1: Median Values of the Sources of Vulnerability 
 
Sources: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The lower growth and lower vulnerability is identified by L, the lower growth and higher vulnerability is identified by V, the higher 
growth and lower vulnerability is identified by G, and the higher growth and higher vulnerability is identified by H. The absence of higher 
growth and higher vulnerability countries in 2000 and 2008 reflects the lack of data in such cluster for those years. 
  Is there a correlation between the growth and vulnerability dimensions? As Figure 2 shows, high 
credit growth rates and loan-to-deposit ratios are typically associated with higher growth rates. In 
contrast, higher fiscal deficits, debt-to-GDP ratios, real exchange rate overvaluation, and short-term 
debt (on a remaining maturity basis) to foreign exchange reserves ratios are associated with lower rates 
of economic growth. A more detailed understanding of these growth-vulnerability combinations 
requires relying on econometric evidence, which is what is pursued in the next section. 
2.  Estimation Results 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the regressors and the components of the 
growth and vulnerability clusters; Appendix 1.A and 1.B describe in greater detail the descriptive 
statistics of the cluster methodology. The next step is to estimate the multinomial logit. The paper 
chooses the worst of all possible outcomes—lower growth and higher vulnerability (V)—as the 
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Short-Term Debt (% of Foreign Reserves)
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reference cluster. The variables and their sources are described in Appendix 2. The regressors fall into 
three broad categories:  
Figure 2: Correlations between Growth and the Sources of Vulnerability 
 
Sources: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The lower growth and lower vulnerability is identified by L, the lower growth and higher vulnerability is identified by V, the higher 
growth and lower vulnerability is identified by G, and the higher growth and higher vulnerability is identified by H. The absence of higher 
growth, higher vulnerability data in 2000 and 2008 reflects the lack of countries in such cluster. 
  Initial conditions. These comprise measures that may be susceptible to policies and institutional 
changes  over  a  relatively  long  period.  This  category  includes  measures  that  reflect  a  country’s 
economic development and its economic structure, as well as the degree to which an economy is 
open to the flows of goods and capital. This includes the initial level of income and oil trade balance 
as a share of total exports plus imports. In addition, measures of trade (exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP) and financial (FX assets plus liabilities as a percentage of GDP) openness are 
included  and,  in  turn,  these  are  accompanied  by  indicators  that  serve  to  qualify  the  type  of 
openness  experienced  by  individual  countries.  Specifically,  the  difference  between  export  and 
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GDP)  is  intended  to  qualify  the  extent  to  which  financial  openness  occurs  in  parallel  with  an 
increased reliance on capital flows that might involved greater stability features. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Econometric Estimations 
 
Sources: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Only the observations in the estimation sample for annual data are included in this table. 
  Policy variables. This category is self-explanatory and is the main area of focus of this paper. For 
fiscal  policy  a measure of  counter-cyclicality  is  used;  namely, the  difference  between  the  fiscal 
balance and the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance. An increase thus represents a tighter fiscal stance. 
Monetary  policy  enters  through  the  change  in  money  velocity;  thus,  an  increase  represents 
monetary tightening. The degree of exchange rate flexibility is measured by the index created by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). This index ranges from 1 to 5 and a larger number represents greater 
exchange rate flexibility. The extent to which the country relies on capital controls is also part of the 
estimation through a de jure index that was created by Chinn and Ito (2008) using the IMF’s AREAER 
report. A larger index implies more openness (i.e., liberalization) of the capital account. 
  Global conditions. This is captured by the degree of global risk aversion as measured by the S&P 
volatility index. It is the only regressor that enters contemporaneously in the estimated regressions. 
All other regressors are lagged to limit endogeneity concerns with growth/vulnerability outcomes. 
obs. min max median mean std. dev. obs. min max median mean std. dev.
Real GDP growth (%) 60 -4.5 8.1 4.8 4.5 2.0 38 -5.7 7.2 4.4 3.8 3.0
Private sector credit growth (%) 60 -27.7 76.1 18.7 19.0 18.7 38 -19.2 69.4 16.9 19.7 17.9
Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 60 -8.2 8.3 2.0 1.9 3.3 38 -2.9 17.6 3.2 3.8 4.3
Loan-to-deposit ratio (%) 60 67.0 187.4 112.0 110.2 25.6 38 81.1 300.9 124.1 140.8 48.0
REER Overvaluation 60 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 38 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
External debt (% of GDP) 60 20.2 106.9 49.5 49.2 18.0 38 20.4 128.0 62.8 68.1 27.2
Short-term debt, remaining maturity (% of FX reserves) 60 0.0 576.9 76.5 85.9 90.1 38 6.4 674.0 115.9 173.5 135.2
Trade openness; exports plus imports (% of GDP) 60 49.5 151.0 86.3 89.0 27.3 38 41.8 171.5 102.2 106.2 31.0
Export and import growth rates, difference in % 60 -22.8 76.7 0.0 3.4 15.8 38 -18.0 26.9 0.7 0.7 9.3
Financial openness; FX assets & liabilities (% of GDP) 60 3.3 63.9 15.5 16.8 10.8 38 3.7 120.6 18.5 25.9 23.0
FDI, net, % of GDP 60 -0.2 23.9 3.8 4.6 3.7 38 0.0 16.4 4.1 4.7 3.2
Counter-cyclical fiscal policies  2/ 60 -1.1 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.5 38 -1.6 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.7
Monetary tightening; Δ in velocity 60 -56.4 23.0 -6.9 -7.8 12.5 38 -26.2 15.3 -4.2 -5.2 8.8
Exchange rate flexibility 60 1.00 5.00 2.00 2.27 1.16 38 1.00 5.00 2.00 2.24 1.17
Capital controls 60 -2.54 1.81 0.09 0.06 1.18 38 -2.54 1.81 -0.96 -0.59 1.46
Initial level of income, share of G7 60 0.02 0.33 0.08 0.11 0.08 38 0.01 0.39 0.15 0.17 0.12
Vulnerability index, VIX 60 11.6 40.0 23.8 23.2 6.8 38 11.6 40.0 20.4 22.0 9.9
Oil trade balance as share of exports and imports 60 -9.5 37.2 -3.4 -1.0 9.4 38 -8.7 0.0 -3.6 -4.3 2.3
obs. min max median mean std. dev. obs. min max median mean std. dev.
Real GDP growth (%) 44 4.8 34.5 9.1 10.4 5.7 36 6.5 12.2 9.3 8.9 1.5
Private sector credit growth (%) 44 -33.8 74.4 27.6 29.3 21.0 36 7.8 65.8 37.9 39.6 13.7
Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 44 -21.0 8.0 0.6 -0.1 4.5 36 -7.2 4.4 0.9 0.2 2.4
Loan-to-deposit ratio (%) 44 75.4 209.9 132.1 131.7 29.9 36 100.6 244.8 150.7 155.0 37.0
REER Overvaluation 44 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
External debt (% of GDP) 44 6.5 100.9 39.2 40.4 21.8 36 17.0 127.7 63.7 62.5 27.3
Short-term debt, remaining maturity (% of FX reserves) 44 0.0 318.0 71.1 80.8 78.1 36 74.5 533.9 227.3 250.7 136.7
Trade openness; exports plus imports (% of GDP) 44 47.2 172.2 87.2 93.1 30.2 36 47.4 166.6 110.7 111.0 26.4
Difference between export and import growth rates, % 44 -38.2 85.8 1.8 3.0 21.0 36 -16.1 14.3 -0.8 -1.5 6.6
Financial openness; FX assets plus liabilities (% of GDP) 44 3.4 60.3 9.8 13.0 11.2 36 3.8 107.3 13.1 29.4 30.5
FDI, net, % of GDP 44 -15.2 32.3 4.0 6.2 8.3 36 0.4 15.6 3.7 4.7 3.6
Fiscal tightening; Δ (fiscal balance - structural balance) 44 -3.4 1.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 36 -1.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.4
Monetary tightening; Δ in velocity 44 -46.0 23.9 -11.6 -9.4 12.6 36 -27.9 12.6 -9.7 -9.7 8.3
Capital controls 44 1.00 5.00 2.00 2.09 0.83 36 1.00 5.00 2.00 2.03 0.94
Initial level of income, share of G7 44 -2.54 1.81 0.09 -0.57 1.60 36 -2.54 1.13 -1.50 -0.72 1.78
Oil trade balance as share of total exports 44 0.03 0.28 0.07 0.09 0.06 36 0.02 0.30 0.14 0.13 0.08
Oil prices, index 44 11.6 40.0 23.8 25.2 10.1 36 11.6 28.6 13.3 15.3 5.0
Vulnerability index, VIX 44 -8.2 63.2 0.0 10.3 18.2 36 -7.4 29.7 -2.7 -0.8 8.8
Lower Growth / Lower Vulnerability (Cluster L) Lower Growth / Higher Vulnerability (Cluster V)
Higher Growth / Lower Vulnerability (Cluster G) Higher Growth / Higher Vulnerability (Cluster H)9 
 
Table 6 shows the results from two estimations: one using annual data and the other using two-
year averages.
7 As noted earlier, the objective of using the two-year averages is to smooth out business 
cycle effects. Clearly, an even longer period would have been desirable from the perspective of purging 
business cycle effects, but limitations in terms of the number of available data points prevented us from 
doing so. The estimated coefficient in the multinomial regressions reflects the likelihood of being in one 
cluster relative to a reference cluster.  As noted earlier, the  reference group used is the lower growth 
and higher vulnerability (V) cluster, which is the worst of all possible outcomes.  
Table 6. Multinomial Logit Estimations based on Growth and Vulnerability Clusters 1/ 
 
Sources: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 
1/ Robust (and clustered) standard errors.  *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent. All regressors, except the VIX, are 
entered lagged. 2/ Difference between fiscal balance and cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance; in percent of GDP. 
The estimation results are best discussed with a few examples. In the estimation that uses the 
two year average data, trade openness enters with a negative (but not statistically significant) sign in the 
lower growth and lower vulnerability (L) cluster. Thus, trade openness reduces the likelihood of being in 
this cluster relative to the reference cluster V (i.e., relative to the lower growth and higher vulnerability 
cluster). In contrast, trade openness enters with a positive (and statistically significant) sign in the higher 
growth and higher vulnerability cluster (H), which indicates that it increases the likelihood of being in 
                                                           
7 The simple two year average is performed for each of the variables; the first two-year average covers the period 1999-2000 
and the last two-year average the period 2007-08. CA is performed on these average values. 
Trade openness; exports plus imports (% of GDP) -0.024 *** -0.022
Export and import growth rates, difference in % -0.017 0.106 *
Financial openness; FX assets & liabilities (% of GDP) -0.024 -0.028
FDI, net, % of GDP 0.038 0.083
Counter-cyclical fiscal policies  2/ -0.230 0.975
Monetary tightening; Δ in velocity -0.015 0.025
Exchange rate flexibility -0.292 0.123
Capital controls 0.273 -0.036
Initial level of income, share of G7 -4.589 -7.907
Vulnerability index, VIX 0.060 * -0.175 ***
Oil trade balance as share of exports and imports 0.318 ** 0.039
Constant 4.283 *** 7.246 ***
Trade openness; exports plus imports (% of GDP) -0.003 0.029 ** -0.005 0.041 **
Export and import growth rates, difference in % -0.068 ** -0.123 *** 0.106 * 0.084
Financial openness; FX assets & liabilities (% of GDP) -0.081 *** 0.049 ** -0.080 * 0.039
FDI, net, % of GDP 0.062 -0.151 0.098 -0.029
Counter-cyclical fiscal policies  2/ -2.032 *** -2.705 *** -0.113 -0.928
Monetary tightening; Δ in velocity -0.016 -0.101 *** 0.084 * -0.026
Exchange rate flexibility 0.001 0.668 * 0.294 1.170 **
Capital controls -0.633 ** 0.008 -0.481 -0.462
Initial level of income, share of G7 -9.681 ** -11.277 *** -13.663 ** -20.481 ***
Vulnerability index, VIX 0.161 *** -0.204 *** -0.117 ** -0.305 ***
Oil trade balance as share of exports and imports 0.474 *** 0.349 *** 0.119 ** 0.090
Constant -0.536 0.379 5.328 * 0.497
Pseudo R-squared 0.396 0.346


























































this cluster relative to the reference cluster. Financial openness enters with a negative and statistically 
significant  sign  in  the  higher  growth  and  lower  vulnerability  cluster  G,  which  means  that  financial 
openness leads to a lower likelihood of belonging to this cluster than the reference cluster.  In terms of 
economic policies, and only as examples, monetary tightening appears to reduce the likelihood of being 
in a higher growth and higher vulnerability cluster and greater exchange rate flexibility shifts a country 
to  higher  growth  clusters—and,  in  both  of  these  cases,  the  shifts  are  represented  relative  to  the 
reference cluster V.
8 
Figure 3. Probability in Individual Clusters (2-year average estimation) 
  Initial Condition— Degree of Trade Openness  Initial Condition— Degree of Financial Openness 
  
   
  Policy Choice— Degree of Monetary Tightening  Policy Choice—Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility 
   
Source: Authors’ calculations. Dash lines are 90 percent confidence bands. 
                                                           
8  Two  statistical  tests  are  useful  when  estimating  multinomial  logits.  The  first  is  the  likelihood-ratio  (LR)  test  on  if  the 
coefficients associated with each of the independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero across all four clusters. The 
second is the LR test that checks if all pairs of clusters are relevant or can be combined. The calculations  for the annual 
estimation in Table 6 suggest that all the independent variables are simultaneously significantly different from zero with one 
exception: FDI net in percent of GDP. However, other specifications do have this regressor as statistically different from zero so 
it is kept. As to the LR test for comparing pairs of clusters, all groups are significant at least at the 10 percent level in both the 
estimation that uses the annual dataset as well as the one that uses the 2-year average dataset. Thus, it can be concluded that 
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Unfortunately, the need to relate the results to a reference cluster makes the interpretation of 
multinomial  logits  cumbersome.  Two  graphical  options  exist  that  help  to  shed  more  light  on  the 
estimation results. The first option is presented in Figure 3. It measures the probability (vertical axis) of 
belonging to each of the four clusters as a regressor (horizontal axis) is changed. At any level of a 
regressor, the sum of the resulting probabilities in all four charts adds up to one. But what matters is 
how the probability in each cluster changes as the regressor changes. Four examples are provided in 
Figure 3. It is clear that an increase in trade openness will increase the probability of being in the higher 
growth and higher vulnerability (H) cluster, and this is also the case for the lower growth and higher 
vulnerability  (V)  cluster  for  levels  of  trade  openness  between  0  and  120  percent.  In  contrast,  the 
probability of belonging to cluster L or G declines or remains stable as trade openness increases. A 
similar pattern is observed for financial openness, though the impact on cluster V seems sharper. Other 
examples are on monetary tightening and exchange rate flexibility, the latter measured by the Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) exchange rate regime classification.
9 Specifically, tighter monetary policies lead to a 
greater probability of a country ending in cluster G while an increase in exchange rate flexibility leads to 
cluster H. In fact, exchange rate flexibility reduces the likelihood of the worst outcome (i.e., cluster V). 
Still, Figure 3 does not provide a metric to gauge the impact of  the changes in regressors that 
could be considered more likely. Undoubtedly, changes in regressors may have an effect on the growth 
or the vulnerability dimensions (or concurrently on both dimensions). For example, if the change in a 
regressor shifts a country from the L and V clusters to the G and H clusters  (or vice versa), then the 
effect is on the growth dimension. In contrast, if the shift takes place from the L and G clusters to the V 
and H clusters (or vice versa), then the effect is on the vulnerability dimension. More involved cases also 
exist. For example, a change in a regressor may lead to a sharp increase in the G cluster: an optimal 
outcome. Or lead to a sharp increase in the V cluster: the worst of all possible outcomes.  But in all of 
these cases it remains unclear how much of a change in the regressor it is sensible to expect. 
Against this background, Figure 4 provides a second option for presenting the results of 
estimations. This figure shows the  impact of a one standard deviati on shock (that is, an  increase) on 
each of the regressors and how this affects the likelihood of being in any one of the four clusters (again, 
lower growth and lower vulnerability (L), lower growth and higher vulnerability (V), higher growth and 
higher vulnerability (H), and higher growth and lower vulnerability (G)). The discussion below presents 
the main estimation results for degree of openness, economic structure, economic policies, and global 
conditions.  
Degree of Openness 
  An increase in trade openness raises the likelihood of being in a higher vulnerability cluster. 
Indeed, a one standard deviation shock increases the probability of being in the higher growth and 
higher vulnerability (H) cluster by slightly over 0.15. It also marginally increases the probability of being 
in the lower growth and higher vulnerability (V) cluster and reduces the probability of being in the lower 
growth and lower vulnerability (L) cluster by about 0.20 percent. Thus, much of the effect appears to 
occur by shifting countries from a lower growth and lower vulnerability cluster to a higher growth and 
higher vulnerability cluster. Thus, trade openness has an effect on both the growth dimension and the 
vulnerability dimension. 
                                                           
9 This is extended to 2008 using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 12 
 
It is worth noting, however, that not all types of trade openness are equivalent. An increase in 
the differential between export and import growth rates (that is, exports growing faster than imports) 
reduces the probability of the worst outcome (cluster V). It also increases the probability of being in a 
higher growth and lower vulnerability (G) cluster and, even more, the probability of being in a lower 
growth and lower vulnerability (L) cluster. Thus, a country’s export orientation reduces the worst of all 
possible outcomes (cluster V). It does provide a metric to gauge a country’s choice of development path. 
Figure 4. Probability and Shocks in 2-Year Average Estimation 
  A One Standard Deviation Increase in: 
 
  Change in the Predicted Probability 
Sources: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the change in the predicted probability in each individual cluster following a change (a one standard 
deviation shock) in the indicator specified in the vertical axis. A positive value represents an increase in the probability of being in that cluster; 
e.g., greater exchange rate flexibility increases the probability of being in the higher growth and higher vulnerability (H) cluster. The opposite is 
the case for negative values; e.g., greater financial openness reduces the probability of being in the higher growth and lower vulnerability (G) 
cluster. The standard deviation shocks are derived from the data for the countries covered and that were observed during the period 2000-08. 
The charts are based on the 2-year average estimation. 
As is the case with trade, financial openness also appears to increase vulnerability. However, it 
appears to do so in a similar magnitude in both the higher growth and higher vulnerability (H) cluster 
and the lower growth and higher vulnerability (V) cluster. Financial openness also appears to reduce 
quite significantly the probability of being in a higher growth and lower vulnerability (G) cluster, an 
effect that does not take place in trade openness. In other words, financial openness might deliver high 
growth, but might also lead to the worst of all possible outcomes (cluster V). Thus, financial openness 
appears to act primarily at the level of the vulnerability dimension. Interestingly, the type of financial 
openness also matters. If FDI plays an important role, then countries are more likely to end in either 
cluster L or cluster G, suggesting that FDI type financing sources have stronger stability features than 
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highlight that countries need to be more aware of these features to maintain sustainable development 
paths. 
Economic Development and Economic Structure 
An increase in the initial income level (relative to the G7 GDP) decreases the probability of being 
in either of the higher growth clusters and increases the probability of being in one of the lower growth 
clusters. This is consistent with income convergence—growth rates are expected to be lower at higher 
levels of initial income. Interestingly, vulnerability is also a factor—cluster V is more likely than cluster L. 
This is a control for level of development, which can be related to the income convergence path. Also, 
we controlled for a country’s progress with its transition path was not statistically significant, but this 
could reflect the particular transition measure used. Specifically, we used the real GDP deviation from 
the pre-transition peak, but other measures, such as EBRD transition indicators, may be worth exploring. 
A larger oil trade balance (as a percent of exports and imports) reduces the likelihood of being in 
a lower growth cluster. Specifically, it reduces the probability of being in lower growth and higher 
vulnerability (V) cluster and the lower growth and lower vulnerability (L) cluster. Conversely, it increases 
the probability of being in either of the higher growth clusters—and much more so in cluster G than in 
cluster H. 
Economic Policies 
A key challenge for emerging markets going forward is to what extent economic policies serve to 
avoid the worst of all possible outcomes (that is, cluster V); in other words, a  high risk (increased 
vulnerability) and low reward (lower growth) scenario is clearly suboptimal. The main findings are, 
  Counter-cyclical fiscal policies seem to lead to an increase in the probability of being in the lower 
growth and lower vulnerability (L) cluster at the cost of reducing the likelihood of all the other three 
clusters.  This  result  could  be  reflecting  the  fact  that  fiscal  policy  is  generally  tightened  when 
countries have already started showing growing imbalances and signs of vulnerability. Whatever its 
source,  a  counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy  serves  to  slowdown  overheating  economies  and  reduce 
vulnerabilities; not a surprising result, but in line with traditional policy advice. In sum, counter-
cyclical fiscal policies seem to have an effect on both the growth dimension and the vulnerability 
dimension and, in particular, are likely to lead to cluster L. 
  Monetary tightening reduces vulnerability and, perhaps surprisingly, seems to support growth. An 
increase in monetary tightening reduces the probability of being in the lower growth and higher 
vulnerability  (V)  cluster  and  increases  the  probability  of  being  in  the  higher  growth  and  lower 
vulnerability  (G)  cluster.  Here  too  the  effect  appears  to  be  across  both  the  growth  and  the 
vulnerability dimensions, but mainly through increasing the likelihood of cluster G. 
  Greater  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  likely  to  shift  a  country  to  a  higher  growth  and  higher 
vulnerability  (H)  scenario  and,  more  importantly,  lead  it  away  from  the  two  lower  growth 
outcomes—cluster V and L. The effect appears to be primarily across the growth dimension, in 
particular on cluster H. 
  De jure measures of capital account liberalization suggest these policies are not good for growth as 
they appear to shift countries away from clusters G and H while at the same time increasing the 
likelihood these countries shift to clusters V or L; in other words, the effect is primarily across the 
growth  dimension.  In  sum,  capital  account  liberalization  has  a  negative  growth  impact.  This 14 
 
somewhat  counterintuitive  result  is  not  new  in  the  literature  and  could  reflect  difficulties  with 
measuring the intensity of capital account liberalization measures. 
Global Conditions 
An increase in market volatility and global risk aversion, measured contemporaneously by the 
VIX, increases the probability of being in  the lower growth and higher vulnerability  (V) cluster and 
reduces the probability of a higher growth and higher vulnerability (H) cluster. The explanation seems 
obvious. Under conditions of market uncertainty, capital flows are likely to be more of a short term 
nature and more volatile; in turn, this increases the probability that countries will face vulnerability 
without growth. 
Discussion 
How good is the model at predicting the actual outcome of cluster analysis? The matrix in Table 
7 shows the percentage of correct predictions by the model relative to the original cluster analysis 
classification. Undoubtedly, the model has much to improve. Still, it correctly predicts about 55 percent 
of the lower vulnerability cases and about 73 percent of the higher vulnerability cases. 
What conclusions can be drawn that can best position countries in a higher growth and lower 
vulnerability path? First, though the results suggest that increased trade openness per se could lead to 
an  increase  in  vulnerability,  it  also  appears  to  help  a  country  achieve  the  most  beneficial  of  the 
vulnerability clusters (group H). Also, the factors underlying trade openness matter; e.g., strong export 
performance (which in turn would depend on structural and macro policies that are not explored in this 
paper)  reduces  the  likelihood  of  higher  vulnerability  outcomes.  It  follows  that  a  country’s  export 
orientation is a source of sustainable development. A similar conclusion was reached by Atoyan. 
Table 7. Model Fit (Predicted Correctly in Percent of Original Cluster Analysis Classification) 
 
Sources:  IMF’s  World  Economic  Outlook  database  and  authors’ 
calculations. The shaded cell in the 2x2 matrix reflects the reference 
cluster,  which  is  also  been  defined  as  the  worst  of  all  possible 
outcomes; that is, lower growth and higher vulnerability. 
Second,  the  results  indicate  that  increased  financial  openness  is  associated  with  increased 
vulnerability.  While  capital  inflows  can  bring  many  benefits,  including  financing  for  productive 
investments and allowing diversification of investment risks, they can also complicate macroeconomic 
management  and  heighten  vulnerabilities.  In  particular,  they  can  lead  to  upward  pressures  on  the 
exchange rate and contribute to overheating, with widening current account deficits and rapid credit 
growth. Moreover, often, when the flows are intermediated through the banking sector, the banking 
sector can play an important role in amplifying the macroeconomic challenges. Furthermore, Inflows 
into the banking sector that are extended as credit to the private sector can lead to the validation of 
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rise  in  asset  prices  increases  the  value  of  the  collateral  that  banks  can  lend  against—thereby 
exacerbating the cycle. But here too the components of capital flows also seem to matter. For instance, 
higher  FDI  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  reduces  vulnerability.  In  part,  this  is  because  FDI  flows  do  not 
contribute  to  the  growth  of  short-term  debt  to  FX  reserves  and  debt-to-GDP  (two  vulnerability 
indicators). In addition, FDI flows are less likely to contribute to the macroeconomic overheating cycles 
that take place through the banking sector and that typically lead to rapid growth in domestic credit. 
Third, the effect of changes in economic policies is quite strong. Monetary policy tightening can 
help reduce the probability of being in a vulnerable cluster as it dampens macroeconomic overheating 
associated with potential increases in vulnerability and it does so with a positive impact on growth. 
Counter-cyclical fiscal policies might on the other hand have a negative impact on growth. However, 
these policies reduce vulnerabilities. This finding seems to be in accordance with the experience of the 
countries in the region prior to the crisis. As discussed and documented in Mitra et al. (2009) and Bakker 
and Gulde (2010), in many of the new EU member states, fiscal policy was not sufficiently tight from a 
demand management perspective and instead served to heighten the overheating of the economy and 
the buildup of vulnerabilities. Indeed, countries that had rapid public expenditure growth also showed 
the pronounced signs of overheating and a buildup of vulnerability (such as widening current account 
deficits),  as  fiscal  policy  exacerbated  private  sector  demand  pressures  in these  countries.  Also, our 
results suggest that exchange rate flexibility can deliver higher growth outcomes while avoiding the 
worst of all possible outcomes (cluster V). Again, this is consistent with the experience of countries in 
the region as discussed in Bakker and Gulde; specifically, they find that most of the countries with 
flexible exchange rates were able to have tighter monetary conditions by letting their nominal exchange 
rate  appreciate,  which  helped  to  keep  inflation  low  and  real  interest  rates  high.  These  countries 
managed  to  have  much  less  pronounced  credit  booms  and  smaller  current  account  deficits. 
Interestingly, from the empirical results in this paper, capital account liberalization does not seem to 
have an impact in reducing vulnerabilities, but does seem to negatively affect growth outcomes. 
Finally, the estimation results indicate the importance of global conditions. Under conditions of 
global  risk  aversion  and  uncertainty,  the  probability  of  being  in  the  higher  growth  and  higher 
vulnerability (H) cluster appears to be low—presumably reflecting the  fact that there is less global 
liquidity fuelling large capital flows which can complicate domestic macroeconomic management. As 
noted in Mitra et al. (2009), the role of global economic conditions, including the impact through income 
convergence aspirations, should not be underestimated as a factor behind the pre-crisis increase in 
capital flows to the region. It remains to be seen going forward, however, if capital market behavior will 
change and limit the economic overheating observed in the pre-crisis period. 
3. Conclusions  
  The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the economic policies and initial conditions that 
can best position countries to enjoy growth without a buildup of vulnerabilities; in other words, a high 
reward and low risk outcome. To this end, the growth patterns of the transition countries and Turkey 
are classified prior to the onset of the 2008 global crisis using a methodology known as cluster analysis. 
Countries are classified into four categories—lower growth and lower vulnerability (L), lower growth and 
higher  vulnerability  (V),  higher  growth  and  lower  vulnerability  (G),  and  higher  growth  and  higher 
vulnerability (H). The definition of vulnerability is multifaceted, taking into account both domestic and 
external dimensions that previous studies have found to be both good indicators of vulnerability to 
financial crises and good indicators of vulnerability to a prolonged recession once a crisis has hit.  16 
 
Using multinomial logit regression analysis, the policies that affect the probabilities of being in 
each of the four possible clusters are examined. This allows us to draw conclusions about policies that 
affect the growth and vulnerability (or reward and risk) patterns. It is true that many (if not most) of the 
countries in our sample experienced very large capital inflows relative to their GDP prior to the crisis, 
which can complicate macroeconomic management and lead to a buildup of vulnerability. These large 
inflows were partly due to the high liquidity in global markets and, at least for some countries in the 
country sample, the particular attractiveness of “new Europe” in the eyes of investors. Nonetheless, we 
find  strong  evidence  that  the  macroeconomic  and  structural  policies  that  over  time  influence  the 
structure of the economy can play a significant role in explaining (and, going forward, in influencing) the 
different growth and vulnerability patterns experienced by the countries covered in this paper.    17 
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Cluster N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Country of Min. Max. Country of Max.
L 12 4.58 1.57 1.94 Georgia 7.30 Albania
V 6 5.21 1.63 2.11 Moldova 6.92 Latvia
G 3 9.94 0.13 9.80 Kazakhstan 10.05 Russian Fed.
H 2 13.44 7.27 8.30 Tajikistan 18.59 Turkmenistan
L 12 3.71 2.91 -4.53 Macedonia, FYR 6.49 Azerbaijan
V 3 1.91 6.61 -5.70 Turkey 6.14 Moldova
G 5 9.05 2.69 6.74 Lithuania 13.50 Kazakhstan
H 4 11.95 5.70 8.05 Latvia 20.39 Turkmenistan
L 11 4.15 1.56 0.85 Macedonia, FYR 5.50 Georgia
V 4 3.94 2.74 -0.02 Kyrgyz Rep. 6.16 Turkey
G 5 9.19 2.47 6.86 Lithuania 13.19 Armenia
H 3 7.79 1.31 6.47 Latvia 9.10 Tajikistan
L 5 4.25 1.23 2.82 Macedonia, FYR 5.77 Albania
V 6 4.76 1.37 2.45 Serbia 6.62 Moldova
G 5 10.43 2.49 7.25 Russian Fed. 14.04 Armenia
H 7 8.40 1.53 7.00 Kyrgyz Rep. 10.25 Lithuania
L 5 5.46 0.85 4.08 Macedonia, FYR 6.31 Bosnia & Herzegovina
V 2 4.56 0.43 4.25 Croatia 4.86 Hungary
G 4 9.07 1.56 7.15 Russian Fed. 10.47 Armenia
H 12 8.81 1.83 6.64 Bulgaria 12.08 Ukraine
L 1 6.39 - 6.39 Russian Fed. 6.39 Russian Fed.
V 12 4.23 1.83 -0.16 Kyrgyz Rep. 6.70 Tajikistan
G 2 20.13 8.86 13.87 Armenia 26.40 Azerbaijan
H 8 9.06 1.06 7.47 Moldova 10.60 Latvia
L 6 5.31 0.91 3.90 Macedonia, FYR 6.32 Bulgaria
V 4 4.51 1.33 3.10 Kyrgyz Rep. 6.23 Poland
G 5 13.85 11.84 6.89 Turkey 34.50 Azerbaijan
H 8 9.42 1.66 7.30 Ukraine 12.23 Latvia
L 11 6.13 1.43 3.00 Moldova 8.06 Russian Fed.
V 4 5.56 3.13 0.97 Hungary 7.80 Tajikistan
G 6 12.85 6.34 8.50 Kyrgyz Rep. 25.00 Azerbaijan
H 2 9.91 0.10 9.84 Lithuania 9.98 Latvia
L 3 2.07 1.29 0.66 Turkey 3.20 Kazakhstan
V 6 -0.05 3.20 -4.55 Latvia 2.76 Lithuania
G 12 6.92 1.94 4.80 Macedonia, FYR 10.80 Azerbaijan











Appendix 1.B. Average Values of Vulnerability Measures, by Cluster Group 
 
 




















L 27.09 3.02 134.97 53.2 65.10 -0.03
V 11.94 4.21 138.86 75.69 306.17 0.01
G 35.64 -0.59 132.86 61.21 122.56 -0.07
H 36.21 3.04 485.35 83.63 43.91 -0.01
2001
L 9.85 2.62 119.65 49.68 102.49 0.00
V 1.42 7.45 108.62 91.05 163.86 -0.01
G 22.06 2.50 115.81 47.69 113.27 0.01
H 24.32 1.50 313.86 67.78 181.44 0.05
2002
L 11.55 2.90 111.16 47.96 84.35 0.01
V 16.52 7.02 111.08 69.31 132.96 0.01
G 9.43 0.04 124.40 47.8 109.42 0.00
H 31.52 1.91 211.79 90.78 216.69 0.00
2003
L 22.96 2.81 98.86 42.11 54.43 -0.03
V 22.47 4.11 118.18 67.31 106.09 0.00
G 24.07 0.05 128.18 45.27 63.73 -0.06
H 34.54 1.39 154.31 63.26 249.53 -0.01
2004
L 20.37 1.78 101.41 43.78 63.24 -0.02
V 11.66 4.89 128.42 71.75 100.35 0.01
G 36.17 -0.77 103.13 30.85 36.09 -0.06
H 36.00 0.96 154.99 61.89 179.43 0.00
2005
L 20.02 -8.15 126.10 33.65 64.48 0.00
V 25.81 1.93 126.64 54.78 70.75 0.00
G 35.65 0.11 111.67 17.44 3.61 -0.03
H 44.40 -0.56 154.80 57.02 241.46 0.00
2006
L 23.17 -0.06 101.85 57.1 69.48 -0.01
V 23.58 4.39 122.58 75.45 76.71 -0.03
G 33.19 -1.47 138.50 28.37 41.07 -0.01
H 46.89 -0.60 163.49 63.9 208.03 0.00
2007
L 34.52 0.23 117.54 57.32 80.59 -0.01
V 52.29 2.84 169.25 75.98 158.65 0.01
G 56.65 0.18 163.63 39.91 65.58 -0.01
H 28.40 0.17 209.29 102.34 319.80 -0.01
2008
L 2.76 0.89 146.11 66.76 119.17 0.01
V 10.80 3.64 218.84 86.42 239.36 0.03
G 22.94 -0.44 143.62 42.93 90.60 0.02
H - - - - - -
External Domestic20 
 
Appendix 2. Description of Variables and Country Coverage 
The country coverage is described in Table 4 and includes: Azerbaijan, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Turkey, Russia, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine. All data sources are 
from the IMF WEO and IMF IFS databases, unless otherwise noted. The definition of the variables used 
in this paper is as follows: 
Trade openness: Exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services, as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Export-import growth differential: Differential between growth rate of exports and that of imports. 
Financial openness: Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities of commercial banks, as a percentage of GDP. 
Foreign assets and liabilities are the 21 and 26C series, respectively, in IMF IFS database. 
FDI, net: Foreign direct investment, net inflows, % of GDP. 
Counter-cyclical fiscal policies: Differential between fiscal balance and cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance, 
as a percentage of GDP. The latter is calculated by subtracting government expenditure from cyclically-
adjusted  revenue.  The  adjustment  is  done  by  using  the  Hodrick-Prescott  (HP)  filter.  Positive  and 
negative values indicate counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical fiscal policies, respectively. 
Monetary tightening: Differential between growth rate of nominal GDP and that of broad money in 
current local currency. An increase means tightening of monetary policies, and vice versa. 
Exchange rate flexibility: Exchange rate arrangements as classified in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). The values range from 1 to 5: higher, more flexible (the coarse 
classification). The original series goes up to 2007 only, and, for 2008, the values in 2007 are used. 
Capital account liberalization: An index measuring the degree of capital account openness defined in 
Chinn and Ito (2006 and 2008). Higher values reflect that a country is more open to capital transactions. 
Initial income: Per capita GDP, as a percentage of GDP of G7 country average. 
Market volatility: Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), end of year. The data are from 
Bloomberg. 
Oil trade balance: Oil trade balance, as a percentage of exports plus imports. 